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ABSTRACT
The national security and academic communities are facing
unprecedented issues that portend the greatest paradigm shift
between the federal government and the global community of
science. For the first time since the formalization of information
policy at the federal level, there is an opportunity to fashion a well
reasoned solution to the growing dual use dilemma in life science
research. This paper examines the biosecurity threat in the context
offederal secrecy policy and dynamics of the information society.
In the absence of a rich literature on secrecy theory, an attempt to
examine the theoretical issues underlying aspects of federal
secrecy policy is undertaken with particular emphasis on classic
problems in secrecy policy. The duty to consider developing
countries when assuming public health risks related to the public
release of dual use biological research is introduced. It is also
suggested that the Executive amend Export Administration
Regulations in order to create a notice mechanism to enable
national security vetting of US. research on select agents, toxins
and microorganisms integrally related to pandemics and
bioweapons.
PART 1: POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation is facing unprecedented challenges on a number of
fronts. Specifically, science, terrorism, federal secrecy and the
information society seemed to have, all at once, challenged the laws
and policies that have governed to date. Advancements in the life
sciences are greater than ever, but so too are the destructive
capabilities they bring. Meanwhile, terrorism has crossed boundaries
with unrivaled depravity, and federal secrecy appears to be rising to
unprecedented levels, raising questions over governmental
transparency and whether the nation's intelligence apparatus is blinded
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by its own secrets. Raising the stakes and reducing margins for error
in all of the above is the inexorable and transformative force of the
information society. Thus, analysis of each new challenge is
warranted, but caution dictates a comprehensive review of the possible
interactions new policies and laws will have for and amongst all of the
above. This paper addresses the intersection of science, secrets, and
national security in the context of the information society.
II. THE UNIQUE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM
The threat from bioterrorism is old in the sense that it is a historic
tool of war and new in the sense that it is viewed as a clear and present
danger in the post 9-11 era. The unsolved anthrax attacks of 2001 and
the more recent use of terrorism on civilian targets in Madrid and
London reinforces the need to address all potential terrorist threats.
Thus, counterterrorism efforts need to focus on conventional warfare
techniques as well as weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
incorporating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
materials that would cause incalculable damage in urban settings.
While all of these threats deserve careful attention, the threat from
bioterrorism is particularly ominous at this juncture due to several
factors. 1  First, the financial, intellectual, and material barriers to
bioterrorism are falling at a faster rate than other WMD threats. It is
already estimated that the cost of killing one person with a biological
weapon is $1 while chemical and nuclear weapons would cost $1000
and $1 million, respectively. 2  Second, although there is hope for
developments in 2006, global efforts such as the Bioweapons
Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 lag behind
comparable nuclear and chemical treaties. Third, while CBRN threats
as a whole are seen as high impact, low frequency threats, infectious
diseases are already high frequency, high impact events. Unlike
unintentional CBRN events such as those at Bhopal and Chernobyl,
microbiological pathogens regularly cause an estimated 1,500 deaths
1 See Marc L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor on Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security, Off.
of Int'l Aff., Remarks at NATO Conference on Elements of Combating WMD Terrorism:
Intersectoral and International Cooperation on Combating Bioterrorism (Sept. 14, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/56614.htm (Dr. Ostfield discusses the uniqueness of
bioterrorism and its impact upon international policy.).
2 p. Scott Layne & Tony J. Beugelsdijk, High-Throughput Laboratories for Homeland and
National Security, 1 BiosEcuarry AND BIOTERRORISM 123 n.2 (2003).
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per hour around the world. Thus the lethality of infectious diseases
provides a uniquely tempting and accessible force of destruction for
terrorists.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND BIOSECURITY
The global nature of bioscience also leads to a greater strain on
biosecurity. Despite widespread use of CBRN materials in industry
and academia around the world, they tend to be more compatible with
tight controls due to their limited and costly uses. In contrast,
biological equipment capable of advancing bioterrorism is nearly
ubiquitous since some of the most basic laboratory techniques can be
used in developing or enhancing virulent pathogens.5 Thus, apparently
benign school, industry, and clinical laboratories in community
settings can be of use to a terrorist with the right knowledge. The
seemingly distant connection between the governance of basic
laboratory facilities needed for health care and the global reach of
bioterrorism was recently recognized in the Kampala Compact of
2005. The Compact recognized that the patchwork of national and
global public health networks is uniquely tied to the threat and
response to bioterrorism. The Compact stated that it is in fact
illegitimate to address the threat of bioweapons without addressing the
enormous health crises facing developing countries.6  The threat of
biosecurity will no doubt bring to the fore the notion that the best
community health money can buy is actually a function of the health
of the poorest communities in the world so long as people and goods
intersect in a global market community.
3 World Health Organization, Report on Infectious Diseases: Removing Obstacles to Healthy
Development, http://www.who.org/infectious-disease-report/pages/textonly.html#Anchorl
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
4 Intentional misuse at lower levels is also of concern. See Anna Arutunyan & Oleg
Liakhovich, Bioterror Suspected in Hepatitis Outbreak, Moscow NEws, June 15-21, 2005,
http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2005-22-8 ("With some 574 people hospitalized with
hepatitis A in the Tver region and an initial influx of some 45 new patients each day, regional
investigators are looking into a possibility that the outbreak... may be linked to a biological
attack.").
Tara O'Toole, Address at the Preventing Bioterrorism, 1st Interpol Global Conference at
Lyon, France: Bio-Terrorism: The Threat of the 21st Century (Mar. 1, 2005).
6 Kampala Compact: The Global Bargain for Biosecurity and Bioscience (Oct. 1, 2005),
http://www.icsu-africa.org/Resource_centre/KampalaCompactoct05.pdf.
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The growing awareness of the transmissibility of self-replicating
pathogens will likely lead to far reaching cooperation as stakeholders
with greater wealth realize the value of investing in public health
networks in developing countries. Unfortunately, however, the lack of
incentives for wealthy stakeholders to include developing countries in
decisions on information policy matters related to biosecurity may
result in balkanized scientific communities. Thus, insular national
approaches to the dual use dilemma may help calcify the divide
between the countries leading in scientific research and the rest of the
world.7 At present, no global organizations are addressing the dual use
issue, with efforts commensurate to the United States. The U.S.,
through the National Institutes of Health, is currently leading a unique
effort to address the dual use dilemma through the creation of a federal
advisory board known as the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB). 9
The NSABB is an original public and private effort designed to
advise the government on ways to draw lines between protected and
public access information. NSABB's pioneering mission presents
many new challenges, not the least of which is its duty to design a
program that assures a biosecurity policy for the United States that is
compatible with the global community. Thus, NSABB must create
policies that support the advancement of the premiere league of
science while being sensitive to the needs of developing nations as
well. For instance, some level of risk is inherent in the study and
publication of research on pathogens. Thus, the government must be
mindful of the risk inherent in conducting cutting-edge research in
U.S. labs and protect the country from intentional or accidental
7 David A. King, The Scientific Impact of Nations: What Different Countries get for their
Research Spending, 430 NATURE 311 (2004) (identifying a divide between the premiere
league of 31 countries which account for 98% of the world's highly cited scientific articles
and the remaining 162 countries which only produced 2%).
8 Shana Dale, Esq., Chief of Staff and General Counsel, Off. of Sci. and Tech. Policy in the
Exec. Off. of the Pres., Address at the Inaugural Meeting of the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity ("Although not overtly articulated at some of the international meetings
I've been to, there appears to be a feeling at least with some of the countries that this is a U.S.
problem and not necessarily for them.").
9
"The NSABB has been established to provide advice to federal departments and agencies on
ways to minimize the possibility that knowledge and technologies emanating from vitally
important biological research will be misused to threaten public health or national security.
The NSABB is a critical component of a set of federal initiatives to promote biosecurity in life
science research." National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity,
http//www.biosecurityboard.gov (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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exposure from infectious diseases. But, consistent with the spirit of
the Kampala Compact, the U.S. must also make risk assessments with
respect to developing countries with less advanced public health
infrastructures. A troubling case in point is the apparent acceptance of
the risk associated with the recent revival'0 and publication of the
genomic sequence' of the Spanish Flu of 1918, based largely on U.S.
resistance capabilities to the flu. The factors leading to a finding of
acceptable risk included, in part, partial immunity against the 1918 flu,
a comprehensive public health system, and U.S. stockpiles of vaccines
that appear to combat the revived virus.' 2 Clearly, this analysis fails to
take into consideration communities that have less immunity, have
faltering public health programs, and lack vaccine stockpiles. The
Health and Human Services Secretary acknowledged the globalization
of public health when he said, "if an avian flu outbreak] happens
anywhere, there is risk everywhere."' Thus, it is no longer acceptable
in the age of globalization for any country to measure public health
risks from infectious diseases according to the strengths within its own
borders. If the U.S. seeks the cooperation of foreign governments as a
key strategy in the fight against avian flu, then, at a minimum, a sense
of fair play dictates that, in policy decisions, the U.S. take into account
the risk of nations without commensurate public health resources.14
10 Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza
Pandemic Virus, 310 SCIENCE 7 (2005).
1 Jeffrey K. Taubenberger, Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes,
437 NATURE 889 (2005).
12 Special Report, The 1918 Flu Virus is Resurrected, NATURE, Oct. 6, 2005, at 794-95
("[Tumpey] adds that even if the virus did escape, it wouldn't have the same consequences as
the 1918 pandemic. Most people now have immunity to the 1918 virus because subsequent
human flu viruses are in part derived from it. And, in mice, regular flu vaccines and drugs are
at least partly effective against an infection with reconstructed viruses that contain some of the
genes from 1918 flu.").
13 U.S. Builds Response Plans for Bird Flu, Bioterror Attack, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at
D4.
14 Lauran Neergaard, Containing Bird Flu Abroad Critical to new US. Flu Pandemic Plans,
THE ASSOCIATED PREss (BC Cycle), Oct. 6, 2005 ("[fln an interview with The Associated
Press, Leavitt said U.S. health officials would rush overseas to wherever a bird flu outbreak
occurred and work with local officials to try to contain it."); Researchers Model Avian Flu
Outbreak, Impact of Intervention, NIH NEWS, Aug. 3, 2005, available at
http://nih.gov/news/pr/aug2005/nigms-03.htm ("[T]hey offered this good news: The models
show that containing an avian flu pandemic at its source is feasible.").
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The members of NSABB decided to make an effort to reach out to
the global community of science at its first meeting in July 2005 so the
results of their efforts are not known at this writing. The structure of a
federal advisory committee does not lend itself to a global forum, but
the inclusion of representative countries beyond the premiere league of
science may be warranted for a U.S. policy that will have
repercussions for biosecurity the world over.
IV. U.S. INFORMATION POLICY AND SCIENCE
It is widely recognized that science advances at its greatest pace in
an open environment where findings are accessible, transparent and
replicable by any interested party. The problem, however, is that the
open science model is not universally appropriate if it provides
terrorists with a free ride from open research in pursuit of malevolent
goals. Although the prevailing model of science is open, it is
important to note that much science is conducted under cover of
secrecy in the interests of national security 15 or financial gain. 16 The
most notorious classified area is atomic science where research is born
classified, regardless of source. The current challenge posed through
the dual use dilemma in life science research forces policymakers to
shed light on the gray areas between classified and open source
boundaries on sensitive information generated by public and private
labs. 17  Thus, members of the NSABB and the policy makers
ultimately responsible for making these decisions should have an
understanding of the troubled state of U.S. information policy before
applying the tenets of extant information policies to the scientific
community.
The prospect of applying a classification regime to life science
research that would otherwise be published openly in academic
15 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON SECRECY (1970), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dsbrep.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
16 See JOHN P. WALSH, ASHISH ARORA & WESLEY M. COHEN, Research Tool Patenting and
Licensing and Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285
(National Academy of Sciences, 2003).
17 Elizabeth R. Parker, Bioterrorism Threats Must Unite Academe and the US. Intelligence
Community, 70 THE EDUC. DIG. 9, 13 (2004) ("In fact, it is the private sector, not the
government that owns and controls many of the structures and facilities that are central to our
conflict with terrorists.").
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journals causes great concern for many.18  The prospect of applying
government restrictions raises concern at the outset because there are
already concerns that the government is over-classifying information
to the detriment of much needed transparency. 19 Moreover, the
publication process is an integral part of the professional life of
scientists and the best known way to advance the field with deliberate
speed. 20 Thus, scientific journals and reports are filled with emotional
polemics decrying the prospect of tearing asunder a system that
advances a fair, oqen, and global practice that serves the interests of
humanity so well. Working from an overly idyllic premise, however,
invites unnecessary emotion into the debate and fails to recognize the
18 Erika Check, Biologists Apprehensive Over U.S. Moves to Censor Information Flow, 415
NATURE 821 (2002).
19 Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A14.
20 Dr. Harold Varmus, Nobel Prize Winner in Medicine and President Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center, Address at Trinity College: The Global Development Challenge,
available at http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/pages/events/conferencespast/confl0July.php (last visited
Oct. 14, 2005) (In a talk regarding scientific publishing, Dr. Varmus succinctly said with good
humor, "All we want is fame.").
21 Statement, National Institutes of Health, Unmasking the 1918 Influenza Virus: An
Important Step Toward Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (Oct. 5, 2005),
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2005/0510state.htm ("It would be impossible
and counterproductive to attempt to enforce a worldwide ban on conducting research on the
1918 influenza virus or similar viruses because of fear of the misuse of such knowledge.");
COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 110 (2004); COMMITTEE
ON GENOMICs DATABASES FOR BIOTERRORISM THREAT AGENTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, SEEKING SECURITY: PATHOGENS, OPEN
ACCESS, AND GENOME DATABASES 36 (2004); see Brian Vastag, Openness in Biomedical
Research Collides with Heightened Security Concerns, 289 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS'N 686
(2003) (Donald Kennedy, went so far as to say, "[i]t is impossible to gauge if a research
finding could ever be used for nefarious purposes."). See Deborah Byrd and Joel Block,
Bioterrorism vs. Science, A Radio Interview with Ronald Atlas, Program #4,124 of the Earth
Sky Radio Series, aired April 19, 2004,
http://www.earthsky.com/shows/edgeofdiscovery.php?date=20040419 (last visited Oct. 13,
2005) (Atlas said, "Science today is collaborative, ... the United States cannot act alone. We
can't look to the U.S. government.. .What we need to do is look to the scientific community
worldwide. This is not a US scientist issue. It is a global scientist issue aimed at protecting
science."). Ronald Atlas, Address at Assisting States to Effectively Fulfill UNSCR 1540's
Legal Requirements, International Consortium for Law and Strategic Security Workshop at
New York, NY (Nov. 15, 2005) (Atlas compared government regulation of sensitive scientific
information with "a license to think.").
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realities of the competitive side of U.S. science. 22  Moreover, the
idyllic view overlooks the realities of the relationship between modem
science and national security. A number of classification regimes
already do co-exist harmoniously with the scientific community.
Moreover, the proposed control of sensitive information is a
logical extension of the widely accepted physical restrictions of select
agents that few, if any, criticized, 23 beyond the headache of paperwork
and fears of prosecution for the mishandling of same. 24 The tighter
one holds the view that science is a pure and global epistemological
endeavor, the more it lends itself to myth. Rather, it is merely
international25 and arguably the most unregulated clinical discipline
despite being subject to many of the same ethical challenges facing
lawyers, physicians and other licensed professionals. Thus, awareness
of export control regimes, the capture of patents, and the vast array of
federally funded classified research at private and federal facilities
adds much needed balance to this debate on how to capture similarly
sensitive research in the largely unregulated field of life sciences.
Figure 1 details a number of existing and proposed restrictions on life
science research.
22 William J. Broad, Top Advisory Panel Warns of an Erosion of the U.S. Competitive Edge in
Science, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A21 (Regarding a report convened by the National
Academies of Science).
23 Helen Pearson, Biologists Seek to Revamp Biowarfare Register, news@nature.com,
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040719/pf/430388a_pf.html (last visited October 14,
2005).
24 Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 42 C.F.R. 72-73 (Mar. 18, 2005) (The CDC
received 110 written comments for the public comment period ending February 11, 2003, and
no comments for the comment period for the interim final rule ending January 2, 2004.).
25 Id.; King, supra note 7 (King notes that the divide between the premiere league of 31
scientific nations is expanding and leaving the remaining 162 nations behind.).
[Vol. 2:1
2006] GORMAN 61
Table 1: Existing and Proposed Restrictions on Dissemination of Life
Science Research
Unrestricted Global Release I
Biological Export Control Regime:Information limited to U.S.
Research Citizens Only 2
DPVientifi 1. Unrestricted release of biological research.
No definition of risk-voluntary restrictions.Academy Only 3 2. ECR: various identified and dual use items
with military, strategic and commercial
applications, (15 CFR § 730.3) in
furtherance of national security, foreign
policy, nonproliferation, short supply
protection, prevention inimical uses against
U.S. interests. (15 CFR § 730.6). See also
ITAR (22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2005)
ors' p 3. Due Process Vetting: Risk evaluated by
hip multiple experts on a common measure then
olicy high-risk data relegated to select academy of
researchers (Gorman, 2005).4. Patent Act: Novel inventions with
implications for national security (195 1).
Classified 5. Editors' Group: Censor research where
Research 6 potential harm outweighs potential benefits;
no provision for protected sharing (2003).
6. Public and privately conducted classified
research, i.e. Los Alamos & Lincoln
Campus, MIT, etc., available in classified
NSABB 7 community.
7. National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity: Under consideration.
One of the few areas of consensus in secrecy policy is the
acknowledgment over the need for a new paradigm. A new paradigm
has been called for by many, 7 including Tom Blanton26  and the
National Academy of Sciences, while others have started drafting
26 Tom Blanton, Remarks at the National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right
Balance Symposium (May 2003), http://www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/foifoe/foi/opengov
("We need a new paradigm beyond the balancing test.").
27 See COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES, supra note 21; COMMITTEE ON GENOMICS DATABASES FOR BIOTERRORISM THREAT
AGENTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, SEEKING SECURITY,
supra note 21.
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plans.28 The need for a new paradigm that assures that information is
shared and protected grows more urgent each day as the stakes in life
science research 29 and public health grow higher.5"
V. U.S. SECRECY POLICY
Despite years of reliance on secrets, it took over 150 years for
significant controversies to develop over access to government
information.31 The government, however, only started to formulate
information (or secrecy) policy in earnest through Executive Orders
(E.O.), legislation, and case law in the twentieth century. The
technical, scientific, and tactical advancements made during World
War II combined with advancements in communication increased the
need to secure information upon which national security relied. Thus,
ever since the 1940's, the federal government has made adjustments to
secrecy policy in search of the appropriate balance of secrecy and
openness. The balance of secrecy and openness in a democracy,
however, is an abstraction; thus, it can never settle on a fixed point.
The perpetual tension between those seeking access to government
information and those in government who need to protect information
assures perpetual dissatisfaction with the balance of federal secrecy
and openness. But, ironically this tension can actually serve as an
asset. The ebb and flow of policy decisions responding to these
pressures may actually help find this elusive target of "balance" in the
murky waters of federal secrecy. Thus, NSABB has a unique
28 See Brian J. Gorman, Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due
Process Vetting, 7 YALE J.L. & Tech. 59 (2005); Robert H. Sprinkle, The Biosecurity Trust, 53
BIOSCIENCE 270 (2003); Michael Barletta, Amy Sands & Jonathan B. Tucker, Keeping Track
ofAnthrax: The Case for a Biosecurity Convention, 58 BULL. ATOM. SCI. 57 (2002); George
M. Church, A Synthetic Biohazard Non-Proliferation Proposal (Aug. 6, 2004),
http://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/ChurchBiohazardO4c.doc; Elisa D. Harris & John D.
Steinbruner, Scientific Openness and National Security After 9-11, 67 THE CBW
CONVENTIONS BULL. 1 (Mar. 2005).
29 Taubenberger et al., supra note 11; Tumpey et al., supra note 10.
30 Gardiner Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, N.Y. TMEs, Oct. 5, 2005, at
A23 ("An outbreak could cause 100,000 to 2 million deaths and as many as 10 million
hospitalizations in the United States.").
31 Harold C. Relyea, Access to Government Information in the United States, CONG. RES.
SERVICE, Jan. 7, 2005, at 1 ("Throughout the first 150 years of the federal government, access
to government information does not appear to have been a major issue among the three
branches or for the citizenry.").
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opportunity to create or endorse a new and lasting paradigm that meets
a variety of compelling goals for the advancement of life sciences,
national security and the global community.
Federal secrets have traditionally served at least two functions.
One has been to protect information from adversaries and the other to
shield policy deliberations from the electorate and others so that
discussions and analysis can be candid.32 Areas typically requiring
secrecy include foreign relations,33 military affairs, and more recently,
counterterrorism. Since modem secrecy policy on science started out
in reaction to a need, i.e. the preservation of atomic secrets from the
Manhattan Project, its development reflects reactive rather than
proactive planning. Thus, due to its relative youth, reactive nature and
need for flexibility in federal secrecy policy, secrecy policy
development has not been entirely orderly. The most stable
developments were made by Congress.
VI. THE LEGISLATURE: SECRECY POLICY AND SCIENCE
Shortly after World War II, Congress passed the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) of 194634 to maintain control over the scientific secrets
from the Manhattan Project. The AEA led to the establishment of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which ultimately formalized strict
rules governing the restriction of information related to atomic energy.
The policies created by the AEC in turn promulgated the most
stringent restraints on scientific information in the U.S. via the "born
classified" doctrine. The result is a standing prior restraint on all
scientific data concerning the proscribed areas of atomic science,
which are considered classified from inception regardless of origin.
The Cold War period followed with additional secrecy legislation.
The Invention Secrecy Act (hereinafter ISA) of 195135 compliments
the "born classified" doctrine in atomic sciences by capturing
scientific techniques critical to national security from any scientific
32 See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in the Carter Administration: The "Open"
Presidency and Secrecy Policy, 27 PRESIDENTnAL STUD. Q. 272, 278 n.2 (1997).
33 See Owen T. Smith, Book Reviews-Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy
that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union by Peter Schweizer, 24 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
883 n.4 ("Frequently, White House staffers were dismissed from Presidential meetings
because of the 'sensitive' nature of the intelligence materials to be discussed.").
3 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (2003).
35 The Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2004).
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discipline that comes to the attention of the U.S. Patent Office through
the application process. The Patent Office screens patent applications
for novel discoveries with implications for national security. Once
potentially sensitive discoveries are identified, a referral is made to the
federal agency with expertise in the discipline covered in the
application, and then a Secrecy Order (hereinafter S.O.) may be issued
which captures the science by classifying it.
36
The ISA, however, was the last capture measure created for "free-
range" science in the U.S., i.e. science conducted by and for private
parties and entities. Thus, there remains a gap in the identification and
capture of contentious 37 science and technology that are classifiable
but evade the limited catchments of the AEA or ISA. The ISA does
offer compensation when it issues a S.O., much like a reimbursement
for land taken by eminent domain. Thus, when it comes to national
security, intellectual property, like real property, is subject to seizure
by the sovereign. There are no other legislative schemes to capture
and reward strategic science beyond that which is commissioned by
the government. This gap was recently noted by a voting member of
NSABB, Michael Osterholm. 38 Thus, the next step in the evolution of
information policy would logically lead to a capture mechanism with
incentives for the science and technology not addressed by the AEA
and PSA.
Much like a sword, secrecy policy cuts both ways, the other side in
this case being access rights to government information. The
Administrative Procedure Act of 1964 was intended to assure
disclosure of governmental information. 39 But unfortunately, it "was
generally recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals and
36 See infra; Secrecy News, Pentagon Pursues "Strategic Influence" (Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2002102/022002.html.
37 Gerald Epstein, Public comments at the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
Meeting in Bethesda, Md. (June 20, 2005), available at
http://webconferences.com/nihnsabb/380405.html (offering the following operational
definition of contentious research: "Fundamental biological or biomedical investigations that
produce organisms or knowledge that could have immediate weapons implications and that
therefore raise questions concerning whether and how that research should be conducted and
disseminated.").
38 Eugene Russo, 1918 Flu Papers test HHS' Ability to Efficiently Monitor Pre-Publication
Dual-Use Research, RESEARCH PoLicY ALERT (Oct. 6, 2005) ("[Osterholm] acknowledged
that the board does not yet have a process in place to monitor pre-publication research by non-
government researchers who do not feel obligated to have HHS vet their findings.").
39 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1964,5 U.S.C. §§ 1002-1003 (1964).
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came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute than a
disclosure statute. ' 4° Two years later, however, Congress mended the
errors of the Administrative Procedure Act by making the single
greatest effort to advance the rights of the access community through
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966. FOIA can be seen as
a formalization of the tradition of transparency in government and also
a radical change in the relationship between the public and government
agencies. 41 FOIA assured the public access to government information
subject to limits for a number of exemptions for personal privacy, law
enforcement, and the protection of classified information among
others.
The bounds of FOIA were tested in the 1970's when members of
Congress tried to compel production of classified documents prepared
for the President concerning underground nuclear tests. The U.S.
Supreme Court, in EPA v. Mink, clarified the limitations of FOIA and
affirmed deference to the Executive in matters of national security.
42
What has been said thus far makes wholly untenable any
claim that the Act intended to subject the soundness of
executive security classifications to judicial review at the
insistence of any objecting citizen. It also negates the
proposition that Exemption 1 authorizes or permits in
camera inspection of a contested document bearing a single
classification so that the court may separate the secret from
the supposedly nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter.43
The Court, however, did not close the door on conflicts with the
Executive branch. The Court noted that Congress was free to establish
its own classification procedures subject to the limitations of executive
privilege or have the Executive adopt new procedures." Congress
also weighed in on secrecy matters in the 1970's after reviewing the
recommendations of the Church Committee. In an effort to curb
activities such as domestic spying, Congress brought about a "major
40 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
41 Lotte E. Feinberg, FOA, Federal Information Policy, and Information Availability in a
Post-9/11 World, 21 GOV'T INFO. Q. 439 (2004).
42 Mink, 410 U.S. at 83.
43 1d. at 84.
4See id. at 83.
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power shift" by enhancing supervision and accountability for covert
activities.
45
VII. THE EXECUTIVE: SECRECY POLICY AND SCIENCE
Given the concurrent authority of the Executive and Legislative
branches over information policy, the question is begged over the
resolution of potential conflicts. The Judicial branch is the likely
arbiter of such disputes, but the Supreme Court is likely to defer to the
Executive when it comes to national security matters. For instance, in
U.S. v. Reynolds, the government successfully barred discovery of
classified materials including an accident report in a wrongful death
case brought by the estates of civilian defense contractors who died on
a military plane testing secret electronic equipment.46 The government
offered discovery of non-classified information, and the Court thought
that was sufficient. The Court was not going to second guess the
Executive in matters of national security. This privilege created great
deference for the Executive in national security matters and has made
challenges to classification decisions through judicial avenues
problematic. As noted by Professor Kellman, the privilege creates a
circular dilemma "because the inquiry itself violates the privilege."
47
A recent development in the Reynold's case underscores the
perpetual fears of government secrecy via abuse of the privilege.
Despite having settled the case with the government decades ago,
relatives of the deceased in the Reynold's case sought to re-open the
Supreme Court case by claiming that the government committed fraud
in the original case. This assertion was made after a review of de-
classified documents concerning the 1948 plane crash. This
development is subject to interpretation. But assuming arguendo that
the allegations are true, one can either find solace in the fact that the
secrecy policies work by eventually providing a check, albeit late, on
itself through declassification mechanisms or find support for
suspicions over the disturbing misuse of the privilege.
48
45 See Loch K. Johnson, Congressional Supervision ofAmerica's Secret Agencies: The
Experience andLegacy of the Church Committee, PuB. ADMIN. REV., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 3, 11
("[T]he Church Committee had been able to bring about a major power shift. Responsibility
for supervision of the intelligence agencies would be largely removed from the jurisdiction of
Armed Services Committee and given the closer attention it warranted.").
4U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
4 7 Marcia Coyle, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Mar. 11, 2003, at A7.
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There were two important cases in the 1970's concerning access
and protection of information which loom behind the current debate on
open science and society. In a case over media access to areas in a jail
with adverse conditions, the Supreme Court held that there are limits
to accessing government information. The opinion spoke to the
delicate balance of secrecy and access rights in dicta by stating, "[t]he
Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an
Official Secrets Act. '49 Lower federal courts weighed in again on
information policy through U.S. v. Progressive. °  Progressive
concerned a prior restraint standoff between a publisher seeking to
publish H-bomb secrets and the government, which foreshadows
recent government requests of scientific publishers. The Progressive
standoff abated after the government withdrew the case. The publisher
eventually published the article in its entirety, 51 but the government
did establish a precedent for prior restraint in the courts by
successfully restraining the article until the government was satisfied
with its vetting of the article.
VIII. EXECUTIVE POWERS
The Executive plays a prominent role in the formation of secrecy
policy due to its authority in national security and foreign policy
matters. The primary tool exercised by the Executive is the Executive
Order (E.O.) which led to the current classification regime. E.O.s in
tandem with temporary legislation provide authority for the current
Export Administration Regulations which restrict export of dual use
technology and information. 5
2
49 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
so U.S. v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Wis. 1979), reh 'g denied, 486 F.
Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979) ("There are times in the course of human history when time itself
may be very important. This time factor becomes critical when considering mass annihilation
weaponry...").
51 Murray Kempton, "The Secret" Revealed, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 6-8.
52 Export Admin. Reg. Database, Part 730 General Information § 730.2, Apr. 29, 2005,
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/730.pdf ("The EAR have been designed
primarily to implement the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app.
2401-2420 (EAA).... The EAA is not permanent legislation, and when it has lapsed,
Presidential executive orders under IEEPA [International Emergency Economic Powers Act]
have directed and authorized the continuation in force of the EAR.").
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The Executive Order is a powerful tool of the Executive that has
been criticized for the growth in power over the years.5 3 Regardless of
the controversy, a review of information policy from the 1940's
reveals an inter-administration learning curve on fundamental secrecy
issues in the Executive branch. For instance, some of the recurring
issues identified through the years concern the scope of classifiable
information, declassification, reclassification, time limits, rationale
labeling and the misuse of classification authority. While the
recognition of common issues appears to have developed, a common
approach toward them has not.
A number of classic issues have been addressed through E.O.s
from the advent of World War II to today. For instance, the first
presidential E.O. on classification policy issued by President Roosevelt
cast a net over strategic materials and delineated a tiered system with
graduated classifying labels, i.e., secret, confidential, and restricted. 5
Two years later, Roosevelt issued another Executive Order 55 which
sought to influence rather than control public information via
propaganda through the Office of War Information.56 Thus, modem
export controls through Export Administration Regulations (EAR),5
7
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the creation of
NSABB and the increased use of public affairs officials to handle the
3 Tara, L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modem-
Day America, 28 J. of Legis. 1, 2 (2002) ("(P]residential directives have been increasingly
used-both by Republicans and Democrats-to promulgate laws and to support public policy
initiatives in a manner that circumvents the proper lawmaking body, the United States
Congress."); William J. Olson & Alan Woll, Executive Orders and National Emergencies:
How Presidents Have Come to "Run the Country" by Usurping Legislative Power,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-358es.html (last visited Oct. 9,2005).
54 Exec. Order No. 8381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1147 (Mar. 26, 1940).
55 Exec. Order No. 9182, 7 Fed. Reg. 4468 (June 16, 1942).
56 Allan M. Winkler, Information Control and Propaganda: Records of the Office of War
Information, Research Collections in the Social History of Communications,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/2upa/Sc/InformationControlPropaganda.asp (last visited
Oct. 24, 2005).
57 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2005).
58 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2005).
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release of government information reflects classic war footing
responses to information control.5 9
Another classic issue that has been addressed through E.O.s over
the years concerns the mosaic theory 60 which was originally addressed
in 195 1.61 In an effort to curb over-classification, President Truman
ordered that decisions to classify rest solely on the contents of the
document in question. President Reagan addressed the phenomenon in
the 1980's by allowing the classification of information in the context
of other pieces of information. Los Alamos National Lab currently
deals with a mosaic problem from the accumulation of non-classified
information that becomes classified when juxtaposed with other
information in forwarded e-mails.62 Truman's secrecy policy also
foreshadowed the current stovepipe dilemma as well when he allowed
department heads to establish higher standards than that found in the
E.O. This action led to obstacles in inter-agency sharing of
information, which continue to plague the intelligence community to
this day.
63
Beyond the classic secrecy problems, modem secrecy policy first
went adrift with the volley of inter-administration policy decisions
beginning with President Carter. Carter introduced a balancing test
through an order in 1978 which framed decisions in terms of public
interest in access and the government's need to protect information
from disclosure.64 This order also tightened classification standards by
raising the standard for "Confidential," the lowest classification
59 Tom Brune, Cadre Grows to Rein in Message, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 2005, at A22 (The
argument has been made that Bush Admin. has hired public affairs officials to help manage
public relations while tightening up the release of information.).
60 Michael Liebman, Line Attorney, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Prepared
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts (Apr. 12, 2000), available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/
liebman.html (last visited July 29, 2005) ("By mosaic theory, I mean that items of information
considered separately are unclassified, but when grouped together they become classified.").
61 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 27, 1951).
62 Thomas J. Bowles, Chief Sciences Officer, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Address
Before the National Science Advisory Board Meeting: Past as Prologue: Are there Lessons to
be Learned from the Nuclear Physics and Cryptography Communities? (June 30, 2005),
available at http://biosecurityboard.gov/meetings/200O506/NSABBBowles.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2005).
63 See infra; Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 27, 1951).
64 Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (June 28, 1978).
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designation. The new standard established by Carter attempted to
shrink the universe of classified information by making the minimum
requirement for classification "identifiable damage" as opposed to
mere "damage. 65 Carter's E.O. is also unique because it set a limiting
clause in the classification of science. The Order stated that basic
science could not be classified unless it was "clearly related to the
national security."66  This order also identified the reclassification
issue by stating that information cannot be reclassified if it was
previously "declassified and released to the public."
67
The longest lasting legacy from Carter's secrecy policy may be the
creation of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). The
ISOO became a fixture that exists to this day under the leadership of
its second director, William Leonard. Thus, Carter assured that federal
secrecy had continued attention. The creation of this office provided a
counterbalance to overclassification by directing complaints and
suggestions regarding classification issues to a central office. Carter
also created an appeal mechanism for contested classification
decisions.
As expected, President Reagan's secrecy policy reflected a
departure from Carter's approach. President Reagan's order in 1982
reversed Carter's E.O. 6?rovisions by expanding the classifiable
universe of information. Reagan removed Carter's "identifiable
damage" standard and restored the broader "damage" standard. In
addition, Reagan removed the prohibition against the reclassification
of information. Reagan allowed reclassification in cases where the
information may reasonably be recovered.
Reagan's orders were silent on science, but he did release National
Security Directive Decision No. 189 on the issue (hereinafter NSDD-
189). Reagan turned to the National Academy of Sciences for
direction on the treatment of sensitive scientific data. In the 1980's,
the security of science focused primarily on the transfer of physical
sciences research from open sources to the Soviet Union. The
Academy convened a panel to address the issue and produced the
65 Id.
66id.
67 Id.
68 Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982).
69 National Security Directive Decision, Directive 189, Association of American Universities,
Sept. 21, 1985, http://www.aau.edu/research/ITAR-NSDD 189.html.
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Corson Report which acknowledged that the need to the classify
science in certain areas is "clearly indicated., 70 Otherwise the report
recommended "limited restrictions" for a small gray area of science
and openness for the remainder. 71 Reagan's NSDD-189 reflected the
Corson Report's recommendations for a least restrictive approach
toward classification by stating, "It is the policy of this Administration
that, to the maximum extent -possible, the products of fundamental
research remain unrestricted.",
7
In addition to the worries over the transfer of open science to the
Soviet Union, there was great concern over the integrity of the nation's
classified information. Thus, in 1985, the Department of Defense
commissioned a Security Review Commission to investigate the
matter.73  The Stilwell Report expressed concern that unauthorized
disclosure of classified information could upset the military balance.
Thus, the report made various recommendations to improve the
security of classified information. In addition, the report opined the
lack of criminal statutes relating to unauthorized disclosure of
classified information. At about the same time as the release of the
Stilwell Report, a criminal case was unfolding over the release of three
classified photos to the press by a Navy intelligence analyst, Samuel
Loring Morison.7 4 The government argued in the rare espionage case
that, "the courts should interpret the espionage laws as applying to the
transmission of classified information to the press." 75 Morison was
convicted and sent to jail, but President Clinton pardoned him at the
end of his term in office. 76  Prosecutions for leaking classified
information to the press are still rare, but as testament to the classic
70 COMM. ON Su., ENGINEERING, AND PUB, POL'Y, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., SCI. COMM. AND
NAT'L SECURITY 4 (1982).
71 Id.
72 National Security Directive Decision, supra note 69.
73 Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to
Review DOD Security Policy and Practices (1985),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/stilwell.htunl.
74 U.S. v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985).
75 Thomas I. Emerson, Comment on "Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and
Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM & MARY L. REv. 845 (1985).
76 Valerie Strauss, Navy Analyst Morison Receives a Pardon, 2 Sentenced in Drug Cases Win
Their Freedom, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,2001, at A17.
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nature of secrecy issues, a similar controversy is underway at this
writing. 77 The government is making a similar argument in the current
spy case.7
8
Much like the Presidents before him, President Clinton was
responsible for revisions in information policy through the Executive
Order.79 The changes in classification procedures made by Clinton
included the requirement to leave the name and title of the person
making the classification decision, along with the rationale for doing
so, with the document. This forward looking requirement was
designed to help in the declassification of documents. In addition,
Clinton's administration undertook an unprecedented bulk
declassification effort in the sanguine glow of post-Cold War victory.
Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary referred to the effort as a way, "to
lift the veil of Cold War secrecy," at the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE).80 Bulk declassification resulted in the release of millions of
declassified pages, but the method resulted in the inadvertent release
of information that should have remained classified. Norta Trulock, a
former director of intelligence at the DOE, claimed that openness had
"run amok" due to the fact that after three years, the DOE released
more than 300 declassified documents that contain nuclear-weapons
secrets.
81
To address this problem, Clinton signed the National Defense
Authorization Act in 1998. The Act had a provision designed to
protect against the inadvertent release of Restricted Data (RD) and
Formally Restricted Data (FRD). The law required the development
and implementation of a plan to prevent the unintended release of RD
and FRD from inadvertent disclosure during the automatic
declassification of 25 year old records.
8 2
77 Rove 'Leak' Sparks US Spy Hearings, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 26, 2005, at 25.
78 Jerry Markon, U.S. Boosts Charges Against Defense Analyst, WASH. POST, June 14, 2005, at
B3.
79 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
80 Richard A. Meserve, Preface to THE NAT'L AcAD. OF SCI., A REVIEW OF THE DEP'T OF
ENERGY CLASSIFICATION: POLICY AND PRACTICE ix (1995).
" Notra Trulock, Clinton Policy Declassified Nuclear Secrets, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 27,
2002, at 45.
92 Memorandum from Steven Garfinkel, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to Senior Agency
Officials of Entities Granted Original Classification Authority by the President (Oct. 28,
1998), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/suspdeci.html.
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IX. SECRECY POLICY AND 9-11
In the short period of time between 9-11 and this writing, secrecy
policy has undergone more changes than any other period in U.S.
history. In order to meet the information policy challenges of the post
9-11 era, President George W. Bush's administration relied on a
variety of tools, including: Executive Orders, le islation,
83
administrative action at the agency level,84 persuasion, solicited
advice from private sector pundits, 86  and federal advisory
committees. 87 Bush, like other presidents, has made repeated use of
the E.O., in an ad hoc fashion. Bush used his first E.O. on
classification to make significant revisions in secrecy policy.88 This
order increased the tendency to classify by removing Clinton's
"significant doubt" standard, which required that a document should
not be classified if there is significant doubt about the need to classify
information.89 Moreover, Bush encouraged more secrecy by ordering
that information should not be disclosed "if the information reasonably
could be expected to result in damage to national security."90 Bush
83 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188,
116 Stat. 594 (2003); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002).
" Press Release, OMB Watch, Right-to-Know Advocates Win Battle for Access to Chemical
Security Data (July 11, 2005), available at http://ombwatch.org/article/articleprint/2909/l/192
(The EPA removed the Risk Management Plan database which contained information on
chemical facilities in October of 2001. The EPA refused FOIA requests from OMB Watch for
the information until a law suit was filed, then the information was immediately released.); see
also Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, The Card Memo (Mar. 19, 2002),
http://www.cjog.net/background-the card-memo.html.
85 Letter from Stewart Simonson, Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Health and Human Services, to Dr.
Bruce Alberts, Nat'l Acad. of Sci. (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bushl
hhs052705.pdf (requesting that the Academy refrain from publishing an article which
discusses vulnerabilities in the nation's milk supply to terrorism).
86 See COMMiTrEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES, supra note 18.
897 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, supra note 9.
8 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
89 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (April 17, 1995).
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also expanded classification opportunities by granting original
classification to the Vice President, the White House Science
91 92Advisor,91 Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency,93 and the Department of Agriculture. 94 Bush also
eased the ability to reclassify information and delayed the automatic
declassification of documents more than 25 years old from April 17,
2003 to December 31, 2006. In addition, Bush gave veto authority to
the Director of the CIA on declassification actions taken by the
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.
Criticisms abound from the tightening of information that has
taken place due to Bush's information policies.95 These criticisms also
address Bush's adoption of stove-piping practices in the tradition of
Truman and Reagan by allowin; 6 department heads to establish
"Special Access Programs" (SAPs). President Bush allowed SAPs,
although he ordered that the number of these be kept "at an absolute
minimum. 97 This practice raises concern that pockets of information
are being secreted beyond the reach of other intelligence agencies,
public access, and declassification protocols in addition to adding to
the tendencies to over-classify. Academics,% the 9-11 Commission,
99
91 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,257 (Sept. 17, 2003).
92 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 88 Fed. Reg. 64,347 (Dec. 12, 2001).
93 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,109 (May 6, 2002).
9 Exec. Order No. 12, 958, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,465 (Sept. 26, 2002).
9 5 TANIA SIMONCELLI, & JAY STANLEY, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SCIENCE UNDER
SIEGE: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND SCIENTIFIC
INQUIRY 1 (2005), http://www.aura-astronomy.org/nv/sciundersiege.pdf("The Bush
Administration has sought to impose growing restrictions on the free flow of scientific
information, unreasonable barriers on the use of scientific materials, and increased monitoring
of and restrictions on foreign university students."); see Anne N. Barker, Executive Order No.
13,233: A Threat to Government Accountability, 22 GOv'T INFO. Q. 4 (2005).
96 Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 2, 1982).
97 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
98 Feinberg, supra note 41.
99 Eileen Sullivan, Too Much Secrecy: Overclassification Hampers Cooperation, FED. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=347512 (The 9/11
Commission Report found: "Current security requirements nurture overclassification and
excessive compartmentation of information among agencies.").
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Congressmen,100 and even the Secretary of Defense have voiced
complaints about the practice of compartmentalization of
information.10' Ordinarily, some critics would be assuaged by the fact
that each agency is supposed to have accounting procedures to track its
compartmentalized secrets,102 but it appears that the requirement is not
consistently followed.0 3 Although quick fixes are tempting and usual
Executive practice, reformers need to be mindful of the tendency of
government agencies to retain secrecy in new ways in response to
efforts to take their secrecy away.'04 Thus, compartmentalization is a
problem in need of a considered systemic solution.
Bush attempted to remedy the problems stemming from
compartmentalized information through an E.O. in June of 2005.1°'
This order focused on some of the same problems as the congressional
hearings in 1997106 by trying to bring uniformity to the classification
system. Bush's order was unique, however, in that it is a temporary
year-long order that allows the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to implement the Executive's policy to standardize
100 Press Release, Congressman Christopher Shays, Shays Holds Hearing on
Overclassification (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.house.gov/shays/news/2005/march/
marchhear.htm ("Shays ... held an oversight hearing about the proliferation of categories of
information that are not classified but are withheld from public disclosure.").
101 U.S. Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, Sec'y
Rumsfeld Press Conference in Phoenix, Ariz. (Aug. 26,2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/ 2004/tr20040826-secdef1261.html ("But the real tension that exists is we have
these stovepipes where only certain people know this and certain people know that.").
102 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
103 Editorial, Too Much Secrecy, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2004, at A24 (Quoting William
Leonard, "What I find most troubling ... is that some individual agencies have no idea how
much information they generate is classified, whether the overall quantity is increasing or
decreasing...").
104 Karen K. Lewis, Why Doesn 't Society Minimize Central Bank Secrecy?, 29 EcON. INQUIRY
403 (1991) (observing in her study of central bank secrecy, "if society tries to constrain
secrecy in one way, central bankers will try to regain lost effectiveness by building up secrecy
in other ways").
105 Exec. Order No. 13,381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,953 (June 27, 2005); Press Release, President
George W. Bush, Executive Order: Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information (June 28, 2005),
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050628-4.html.
106 COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOV'T SECRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at 11 (1 st
Sess. 1997).
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and improve the sharing of classified information between departments
in the Executive Branch. The Order states, "agency functions relating
to determining eligibility for access to classified national security
information shall be appropriately uniform, centralized, efficient,
effective, timely, and reciprocal."407  This order also attempts to
address the loophole found in SAPs that leads to stovepipes of
classified information. Both Sensitive Compartmentalized
Information (SCI) and SAPs, with the exception of operational,
strategic, and tactical military SAPs, were addressed by this order.
Since this order did not change the general access restrictions, i.e.
need-to-know, si ned non-disclosure agreements and agency head
approval prongs, 80MB will likely focus on the subjective areas in
the agency approval and need-to-know prongs.
Bush's repeated orders to share information may indicate that it
may take more than merely stating the goal to obtain a successful
outcome. An order from August 27, 2004 addressed sharing of
information between agencies in the intelligence community. 0 9 Also,
another order on August 27, 2004 ordered cooperation between the
heads of agencies holding terrorism information and the new
Counterterrorism Center."10 Agencies are specifically instructed to
give prompt terrorism information to the director of the Center. This
builds upon an order from May 14, 2003 which addresses the sharing
of "terrorism information" between agencies and with appropriate
designees in state and local governments.'' Although sharing orders
between agencies have a high failure rate, similar orders directing
action within an agency tend to be more effective due to the
identifiable accountability placed in the agency director and his ability
to authorize compliance with the order through a chain of command.
In contrast, inter-agency orders on sharing lack accountability and
authority for execution among co-equal agency heads. Therefore,
temporary management E.O.s like E.O. 13,381 may prove to be the
effective model in these circumstances.
The ripple effect of the failed orders can be seen in local and state
remedies to the problem. In response to the failure to receive adequate
107 Exec. Order No. 13,381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,953 (June 27, 2005).
108 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
109 Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004).
110 Exec. Order No. 13,354, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,589 (Aug. 27, 2004).
111 Exec. Order No. 13,301, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,981 (May 14, 2003).
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and timely classified information from the federal government, Chief
William J. Bratton of the Los Angeles Police Department recently
initiated a grassroots network of information sharing between major
police departments to fill the gap. 12 But, such grassroots efforts need
to be coordinated since they run the risk of duplicating the work of
state based "fusion centers" where homeland security information is
also collected and analyzed." 13
One of the more controversial" 4 efforts in Bush's information
policy concerned an attempt to tackle the gray areas of science and
secrecy via the "sensitive but unclassified" approach (SBU) via the
Card memo. 115 The Card memo reminded agency heads of their
obligation to safeguard sensitive documents related to weapons of
mass destruction, regardless of its age, and is credited for being the
impetus for the removal of over 6,000 pages of government web pages
from the Internet. 116  The Card memo caused such uproar in the
scientific community that it is easy to understand why many, such as
the ACLU, fell under the misapprehension that the Bush
administration actually created this label."' But, the SBU label has
112 John M. Broder, Police Chiefs Moving to Share Terror Data, Los Angeles Official
Spearheads Effort to Create a Network, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29,2005, at A15.
113 A Progress Report on Information Sharing for Homeland Security, Testimony Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment, 109th Cong. 4 (July 20, 2005) (statement of John D. Cohen, Senior Homeland
Security Policy Advisor for the Commonwealth of Mass.) ("[A]lmost every state is
establishing an 'information fusion center' - a location where homeland security-related
information can be collected and analyzed.").
114 See William J. Broad, Threats and Responses: Security Measures; Researchers Say Science
is Hurt by Secrecy Policy Set Up by the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A8;
Megan Twohey, Security Restrictions from Government Put Researchers in a Bind, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 10, 2003, at FI ("More than 50 troublesome [federal research]
contracts [with universities] have been identified so far."); William Matthews, 'Sensitive'
Label Strikes a Nerve, FED. COMPUTER WEEK, Oct. 31, 2002,
http://www.fcw.com/article78010-10-30-02-Web.
11 Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Asst. to the President and Chief of Staff, to the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/wh031902.html.
1 6 See Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, supra note 84.
... TANIA SIMONCELLI, ET AL., SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 95, at 6.
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actually been used by a number of government agencies since at least
1977.'8
The SBU designation is also controversial due to the fact that it has
inconsistent definitions throu*_.out the government. Definitions vary
from broad uses at the DOE 9 to an entirely different and narrower
use at the Department of State.120 Even if a uniform definition on SBU
is reached, the question remains how SBU fits into an accountable and
transparent classification system. OMB has been charged with the
difficult task of providing clarification on this issue, 121 but no direction
has been made public as of this writing from OMB.
X. THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND BIOSECURITY
One of the arguments used against government classification of
scientific knowledge relies on the fact that sophisticated articles, on
the most lethal of pathogens, have natural barriers due to the tacit
knowledge, lacking in the "typical" terrorist, needed to make use of
the information. 22 This argument, however, is losing credibility with
each passing day. First it is undisputed that "biotechnical know-how
is spreading quickly."'n' Furthermore, it is unwise to underestimate
and stereotype terrorists. The fact that one of the suspects in the recent
London subway bombings was a graduate student in biochemistry at a
118 Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive but Unclassified" and Other Federal Security Controls on
Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current Controversy, CONG. RES. SERVICE,
Apr. 2, 2003, at 10.
19 Id. at 20 (The DOE definition concerns, in part, "Information for which disclosure, loss,
misuse, alteration, or destruction could adversely affect national security or governmental
interests.").
120 Id. at 47 (The Department of State definition of SBU includes: "[m]edical, personnel,
financial, investigatory, visa, law enforcement, or other information which, if released,
could have a negative impact upon foreign policy or relations.").
121 Before the H. Comm. on Sci., 106th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2002) (statement of The Honorable
John H. Marburger, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy), available at
http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full02/octI0/marburger.htm ("On the subject of
sensitive information, OHS has asked OMB to develop guidance for Federal agencies to
ensure consistency of treatment of 'sensitive homeland security information' across the
Federal government and by recipients of such information.").
122 Judith Reppy, Dual Use Information. Issues for NSABB, CORNELL UNIV., June 30, 2005,
available at http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/meetings/200506/Reppy.pdf ("The tacit
component of cutting-edge research offers some protection against bioterrorists.").
123 Christopher F. Chyba, Toward Biological Security, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 127 n.3 (2002).
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major research university should help disabuse the allure of the tacit
knowledge argument. 1
24
The bounty of the information society may also make philosophers
and policymakers question the wisdom of unlimited access to
advanced scientific information. Thus, the question is whether the
nation is back to where it was in the 1980's with concerns over the
transfer of science and technology to the opposition. Needless to say,
a great commotion would have likely ensued in the Reagan era if a
Soviet spy had been caught walking out of a U.S. university library
with copies of entire volumes of scientific journals. Now, however,
recent advances in communication technologies can aid in the
acquisition and instantaneous delivery of entire volumes of the world's
most sophisticated science and technology journals to any interested
party the world over. Today that scenario would in fact pose a greater
threat since an adversary would be walking off with more dual use
articles having WMD potential than ten years ago.125
Unfortunately, this situation may not be hypothetical. A number of
universities have recently experienced bulk downloading of scientific
journals. It has been disclosed that unsanctioned downloading has
occurred at Simon Fraser University, 126 Northwestern University 121
124 Egypt will not Hand over London Suspect, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 16, 2005, available at
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Londonattacks/,,2-10-1854_1738691,00.html (A
suspect of the July 7, 2005 subway bombings is a graduate student in biochemistry in Leeds,
UK.).
125 Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul & Eckard Wimmer, Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus
cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, 297 Science 1016
(2002); Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. of Virology 1205 n.3 (2001); Lawrence M. Wein & Yifan Liu,
Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk, 102
Proceedings of the Nat'l Acad. of Sci. of the U.S. 9984 n.28 (2005); Taubenberger et al.,
supra note 11; Tumpey et al., supra note 10.
126 Simon Fraser Univ. Library Collections Management Activity Report (Oct. 2004),
http://www.lib.sfu.ca/about/collections/monthly reports/CollMgmtO41O.htm (In October of
2004, an e-journal publisher detected bulk downloading by a user and cutoff services for 4
days at Simon Fraser University. The University reports that it identified the user and
resolved the situation.).
127 Lloyd A. Davidson, The End of Print: Digitization and Its Consequence-Revolutionary
Changes in Scholarly and Social Communication and in Scientific Research, 24 INT'L J. OF
ToxicoLoGY 25 (2005) ("In one case we had somebody come into a library at Northwestern
and proceed to download a significant fraction of the online contents of a physics journal
database...").
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and the University of Nevada, Reno. 12 8  It is not clear whether the
downloading at Nevada involved scientific journals, but the Simon
Fraser and Northwestern incidents, respectively, concerned optical
engineering and physics. It appears, however, that this problem
concerns far more university libraries than indicated by the
aforementioned examples.
Thus, in order to informally investigate this matter further, a
general inquiry 129 was made about this issue on a List Serve for
research libraries, 130 and a number of public postings and private
responses ensued indicating that this is not an isolated problem. Due
to a number of issues, many respondents did not want public
attribution of the bulk downloading experiences to their institutions. It
does appear, however, that sophisticated scientific journals may be
well represented in bulk downloading incidents. In one instance a
university was notified of the apparent download of two entire journal
volumes from the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.'
3 1
The downloaded journals were from the Journal on Matrix Analysis
and Applications, which is described as providing papers of interest to
the numerical linear algebra community with applications for a
number of areas including mathematical biology. 132  The other
128 Posting of Rick Anderson, rickand@unr.edu, to Liblicense- 1 @lists.yale.edu (July 1, 2005)
(on file with author), available at http://www.library.yale.edu/-llicense/ListArchives/
0507/msg00006.html ("In answer to Dr. Gorman's question, yes, we have had occasional
problems with users massively and systematically downloading entire runs of online journals -
- in at least one case, the student was burning the journal content to CD's so that he could take
it home to a country known for its lax copyright law enforcement.").
129 Posting of Lloyd Davidson, Ldavids@northwestem.edu, to Liblicense-I @lists.yale.edu
(June 29, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://library.yale.edu/-Uicense/
ListArchives/ 0506/msg00180.html ("Q: Have any of your libraries discovered cases of
suspicious downloading patterns from scientific journals or other technical resources by walk-
in or other users (e.g. massive downloading to capture a journal's archive)?").
130 Liblicense: Licensing Digital Info., http://www.library.yale.edu/-license/index.shtml (last
visited Oct. 24, 2005).
131 SIAM Journals Online: The Accelerated Electronic Journals of the Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics, http://epubs.siam.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
132 SIAM J. on Matrix Analysis and Applications, http://epubs.siam.org/sam-bin/dbq/
toclist/SIMAX (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) ("The SIAM Journal on Matrix Analysis and
Applications publishes research articles in matrix analysis and its applications and papers of
interest to the numerical linear algebra community. Applications include such areas as signal
process, systems and control theory, statistics, Markov chains, and mathematical biology.
Also contains papers that are of a theoretical nature but have a possible impact on
applications.").
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downloaded journal was Theory of Probability and Its Applications,
which is described as a journal containing papers on the theory and
application of probability, statistics, and stochastic processes.1
33
Clearly these downloading incidents may have had many
motivations from nefarious to benign and naive. In fact, a number of
respondents suggested explanations for such downloading as research
projects on information sciences and neural processing. Moreover,
bulk downloading may simply be a convenient tool in certain
circumstances. For instance, the National Institutes of Health has an
open access webpage with a guide to a number of websites offering
bulk downloading of chemical structural databases. 134 It does appear,
however, that the bulk downloading of scientific information is an
issue worthy of further debate and investigation. This inquiry must
also address the ethical and legal issues in light of past controversies'
35
and current legislation concerning the investigation of library usage. 136
As previously discussed, academic issues are more global now than
ever. Thus, actions taken in the U.S. need to be compatible with the
academic community beyond the borders of the country because the
U.S. is not the sole producer of scientific knowledge. 1
37
XI. THE BIOHACKER THREAT
Another threat from exposure to advanced scientific information
comes from what is known as the biohacker. Unfortunately, similar
133 Theory of Probability and Its Applications, http://epubs.siam.org/sam-bin/dbq/toclist/TVP
(last visited Oct. 24, 2005) ("Theory of Probability and Its Applications is a translation of the
Russian journal Teoriya Veroyatnostei i ee Primeneniya, which contains papers on the theory
and applications of probability, statistics, and stochastic processes.").
134 Chemistry Databases, http://cactvs.cit.nih.gov/ncidb2/chemwww.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2005).
35 See American Library Ass'n Documents Round Table, GODORT Resolution,
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/GODORT/resolutions/880713774.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
13 6 Eric Lichtblau, Senate Makes Permanent Nearly All Provisions of Patriot Act, With Few
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2005, at All (The provision allowing the demand of
records from libraries is renewed and set to expire in four years unless Congress reauthorizes
the provision at that time.).
137 Bernd Wegner, EMIS 2000: The European Mathematical Information Service and lts
Developments, 25 ONLINE INFo. REv. 165 n.3 (2001) ("The main purpose of EMIS is to
provide freely available information on mathematics in the Web. ... freely available digital
content of classical mathematical publications and access to grey literature.").
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dynamics that led to computer hackers are rapidly developing in the
life sciences as well. Life and computer sciences are similar in that
they both originally had high barriers to entry to sophisticated
applications, but they both saw reductions in barriers as technology
improved and proliferated throughout private industry. The spread of
computer usage into personal use led to the widespread use and
anonymity of usage which also enabled hackers to make and spread
computer viruses from the privacy of their own homes. Precocious
youths with access to sophisticated equipment appear to fall victim to
the temptations of computer hacking more than most. The recent
conviction of a German teenager for causing billions of dollars in
damage with the "Sasser" virus is a prime example. A 17 year old
from Germany named Sven Jaschan created a computer virus that
affected millions of computers around the world and caused more than
$6.25 billion in damages.' 38  Unfortunately, however, domestic
saboteurs and malicious thrill seekers from the adult population are
problems as well. 1
39
It is unlikely that personal biolabs will be as common as the
ubiquitous personal computer any time soon, if at all, but it is likely
that precocious youths around the world in wealthier countries will
have access to advanced dual use equipment that is the center of
today's controversy in biosecurity. The most gifted high school
students are already conducting research related to poxviruses.1
40
Thus, it is a matter of time before more and more students acquire
similarly advanced skills and access to equipment at their schools and
homes. r41 In this connection, the falling costs and unrestricted access
138 Daniel Thomas, Businesses Let Down'by Virus Writer Ruling, COMPUTING, July 13, 2005,
at6.
139 Jeffrey Gold, Man Who Admitted Shining Laser at Aircraft Indicted on Patriot Act Charge,
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (BC Cycle), Mar. 23, 2005, available at http://phillyburbs.com/pb-
dyn/articlePrint.cfin?id=467145 ("A cluster of reports of lasers striking airplanes received
wide attention between Christmas and New Year's Day.").
'40 64th Annual STS (2004-2005) Finalists Kelley Harris, http://www.sciserv.org/sts/64sts/
Harris.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (A recent teenage finalist in the Intel Talent Search
conducted a study related to a poxvirus.).
141 Meeting of the National Security Advisory Board for Biosecurity, July 30, 2005,
http://www.webconferences.com/nihnsabb/380405.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) ("My
colleague said that not only are these things already the tools to do life science research
already in colleges, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's not too many years before we see this
sophisticated ability in high school laboratories. Given that, the question then becomes is it
only the intentional adversary that we have to think about. As my friend said a moment ago,
no, it's probably not. We have to worry about the mischievousness. We have to worry about
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to biochemical technology raises many concerns. Professor George
Church and Interpol have proposed licensing of certain biological
equipment. 142  This effort would be consistent with increased and
forthcoming federal control of chemical 143 and biological agents. 44
Professor Church warns that, "the future biodesigner will not need a
detailed knowledge of biochemistry to effectively create complex
biochemical machines."' 145  Complex and expensive procedures are
becoming easier and cheaper to accomplish. For instance, synthetic
biology equipment capable of producing strings of nucleotides can be
purchased over the Internet for discount prices. 46 Knowledge about
the discipline is proliferating and the circle of accomplished scientists
is growing wider over time. In light of the growing access teenagers
are getting to dual use laboratories, greater emphasis must also be
placed on the ethics of bioscience at the earliest ages as well. Thus,
the goal of devising ethical codes and training for professionals must
be widened to include younger students as well.
Potential economic liability for the misuse of synthetic biology
may help foster the development of ethical codes and licensing efforts.
Germany recently introduced a law that holds an individual liable for
damages from the accidental spread of genetically modified crops.' 47
Beside the ever present biosecurity threat to the food supply, 148
those who are simply curious and those who are not old enough who have quite developed the
super functioning ego.").
142 Church, supra note 28; Ted Agres, Interpol Pushes Research Controls, THE SCIENTIST, July
21, 2003, http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20030721/03.
143 Bush Administration Endorses Chemical Security Requirements, OMB WATCH, June 15,
2005, http://www.ombwatch.org/homeland/OMBWChemSecurityState.pdf.
144 See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2003); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2002).
145 Chappell Brown, Experts Worry that Synthetic Biology may Spawn Biohackers, EE TIMES,
June 29, 2004, http://www.eetimes.com/news/latest/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22102744.
'4 See Grizzly Analytical Biotech Lab Equipment, http://www.grizzlyanalytical.com (last
visited Aug. 2, 2005) (Grizzly Analytical sells used, reconditioned and rebuilt biotech lab
equipment.).
14' Ned Stafford, GMLaw 'A Blow for Science', THE SCIENTIST, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20041201/01.
148 Michael Doyle, New Alert Bares Risk to State's Ag Industry, Despite Increased Security
Nationwide, Our Food Supply Still Isn't Safe Officials Say, The Sacramento Bee, Mar. 19,
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accidental genetic modification of crops could likewise lead to
devastation of certain crops. The accidental spread of genetically
modified crops, such as the recently created ball of corn, which is a
mutation away from the traditional stalk of corn, could have a
disastrous impact on the agricultural industry. 149 Liability in the lab is
another issue that will grow as more researchers work with self-
replicating organisms. Courts have been reluctant to hold academics
responsible for the harm resulting from the application of controversial
techniques in the past, 50 but the question remains how the courts will
deal with life science cases.
PART 2: THEORY
XII. TOWARD THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
U.S. secrecy policy may be the most criticized and under analyzed
area of federal policy. Congress holds hearings on secrecy from time
to time,151 the ISOO keeps track of statistics, and others provide plenty
of criticism, but there is little substantive analysis on the theoretical
underpinnings of secrecy policy. More analysis is needed on the
function of secrecy and acquisition of information by the government.
The concept of capturing and classifying science can, at times, be a
very emotional issue that strikes at the heart of one's pride, livelihood,
and philosophy. The juxtaposition of two disparate comments on
scientific knowledge and secrecy in the aftermath of two notoriously
destructive events demonstrates the sharp differences.
There has been a lot of talk about the evil of secrecy, of
concealment, of control, of security .... the almost unanimous
2003, at D2 (" 'Experts ... generally agree that terrorists could use food products as a vehicle
for introducing harmful agents into the food supply,' the GAO warns.").
149 Jamie Talan, Gene Makes Tidy Earful, NEWSDAY, July 25, 2005, at A29 (Scientists created
a large ball of corn in lieu of a stalk by modifying its genetic make up.).
150 See Storch v. Syracuse University, 629 N.Y.S.2d 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See also Brian
J. Gorman, Facilitated Communication in America: Eight Years and Counting, SKEPTIC, July-
Sept. 1998, at 64 (Liability is discussed relative to the distinction between academic theory
and academic action.).
' REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY,
APPENDIX G: MAJOR REvIEWs OF THE U.S. SECRECY SYSTEM (1997), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2005).
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resistance of scientists to the imposition of control and
secrecy is a justified position... it is the highest value to share
your knowledge, to share it with anyone who is
interested .... and are willing to take the consequences.
-Phycisist, J. Robert Openheimer, November 1945.52
We have to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good,
knowledge should be publicly available, that information
will liberate us... Information will kill us in the techno-
terrorist age, and I think it's nuts to put that stuff on Web
sites. -Bioethicist, Arthur Caplan, November 2001.53
Secrecy policies have historically relied upon the simple
bifurcation of military and civilian science. The bright line that
separated military science from civilian science, however, has been
blurred due to the dual uses of science. The problem is compounded
by the fact that the growing sophistication of science, especially the
life sciences, has increased in lethality. 54 Additionally, the means of
communicating this lethal dual use information has become so facile in
the information society that the temporal advantages and tacit barriers
relied upon with science have all but vanished with regard to
biosecurity.
All national security secrets appear to consist of two core elements:
time and risk. If there is no risk derived from disclosure of the
information, then there is no reason to have it classified. Moreover, if
it is impossible to secure the information for any length of time, no
matter how great the risk, logic dictates that it can not be secret. The
apparent simplicity of these elements should not deter analysis into
how these elements function. Rather, a better understanding of these
elements should help in addressing challenges in formulating federal
secrecy policy for both scientific and nonscientific information.
'
52 J. Robert Oppenheimer, Speech to the Association of Los Alamos Scientists, (Nov. 2,
1945), available at
http://www.honors.umd.edu/HONR269J/archive/OppenheimerSpeech.html.
13 Eric Lichtblau, Rising Fears that What We do Know can Hurt Us, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 18,
2001, at Al.
'5 Tumpey et al., supra note 10.
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XIII. RISK
The critical concept of risk is mentioned here in passing but it
requires far more attention than this paper can provide. For purposes
of this article, however, risk will be defined with Skinnerian simplicity
as the increased probability of danger as result of exposure.' 55 Unlike
atomic weapons research, the scientific community cannot agree on a
bright-line demarcation for sensitive bioweapons research because
these findinzs may also benefit society through medical
advancements. !6 In this connection, it is important to note the "intent
fallacy" which repeatedly thwarts further analysis of risk on life
science research. The claim of good intent has served as the shield and
justification for the publication of several controversial life science
articles of late. But this rationale, which overrides dangers as grave as
pandemics, is unforeseen and without precedent in society. When
searching for precedents on this matter, one is left with few choices.
Thus, to find precedents for a commensurate disregard of a risk to
human life for the benefit of society, one may have to go as far as
Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb in World War II. Outside
of the parameters of war, however, criminal law limits the shield of
good intent when balancing against a knowing disregard for a risk to
others. Of course, one may have to disregard a known risk when there
is justification, but it is unforeseeable in our jurisprudence that
pandemics or mass casualties could be justified for the vague promise
of unspecified benefits for society. Cleary, in a criminal or tort
context, the duty of care would oblige the scientific community to put
up some sort of minimal guards for the attractive nuisance of research
with bioweapons potential. Unfortunately, there are no set standards
by which to measure the potential risk a scientific paper poses to
national security. 157 Even the Patent Office filter remains largely
155 See also S.N. Jonkman et al., An Overview of Quantitative Risk Measures for Loss of Life
and Economic Damage, A99 J. OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 1, 2 (2003) (A review of risk
literature resulted in the following definition of a risk measure: "a mathematical function of
the probability of an event and the consequences of that event.").
156 Charles M. Vest, President, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Report of the President for the Academic
Year 2001-2002: Response and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in Research
and Education (Sept. 2002) ("[N]uclear weaponry seems to be an almost singular case ... The
knowledge of what makes a virus virulent is also the key to medical therapies and disease
prevention.").
157 Arturo Casadevall and Liise-anne Pirofski, The Weapon Potential of a Microbe, TRENDS
IN MICROBLoGY 6 (2004) (The authors present a formula for evaluating the weapons
potential of microbes. This formula was designed for the evaluation of select agents, but
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undefined despite having been in use for years. E.O.s are not much
better since they address risk in an imprecise manner and lack
quantifiable standards and operational definitions. The concepts of
risk are vaguely addressed through the tiered classification system, but
more precise guidance would certainly prove helpful in addressing
chronic over-classification issues. Thus, it is no surprise that the
scientific community is having difficulties evaluating the potential risk
of publishing scientific information.
The absence of objective standards apparently steers classifiers to
determinations offering the least discomfort. As a result, government
workers will tend to over-classify to avoid mistakes that harm their
careers, and publishers will likewise protect their livelihoods by
leaning against classification. Risk assessment is often recognized as a
challenging gray area, but little more has been done or said about it.
Thus the challenge is to understand risk and then accurately measure,
identify, and group sensitive information with like kind and in the best
interests of society.
There has, however, been some recent progress on the
identification and assessment of risk in life science research. The
National Academy of Sciences Report on Terrorism identified seven
"experiments of concern" to help identify articles of concern in
2004.158 In addition, these findings were operationalized and
combined with other factors to create an eighteen item Likert-type
Risk Assessment Scale in the spring of 2005.1'9 Unfortunately,
members of the scientific community have fallen prey to the
"vividness heuristic" 160 of an "I know it when I see it" approach when
identifying risky science and an untenable ad hoc standard for the
disposition of contentious science. 
161
further analysis needs to address whether it can be applied to a risk analysis of academic
papers.).
158 See COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS AND PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 2 1.
159 See Gorman, supra note 28.
160 See generally MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE, 269-75
(1994) (Professor Perlin explains the phenomenon of the oversimplification of complex issues
via the vividness heuristic.).
161 See Paula Park, New Standards for Publication of Sensitive Research, THE SCIENTIST, Feb.
17, 2003, http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20030217/08 ("Atlas compared the process to
defining pornography. 'I know it when I see it,' he said.").
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Although the prevailing Editor's Group standard for the disposition
of high risk science was arguably a pretext for continued self-
governance of scientific matters, 162 despite denials, 163 the prevailing
standard must be addressed. The Editor's Group standard, i.e. the
"preponderance of harm standard," holds that censorship or
modification of an article is warranted when the ,,otential harm of a
paper outweighs its potential benefits for society. Unfortunately, it
appears that the Editor's Group preponderance of harm standard was
bootstrapped into rushed deliberations by the NSABB over the
Spanish flu articles.1
65
This preponderance of harm standard must be abandoned because
it oversimplifies the issues, fails to operationalize or define risk, and
invites redundant consideration of the presumption that all knowledge
could benefit mankind. Moreover, the benefit prong merely invites
wide-eyed speculation on how beneficial the potential article can be
for mankind. No extant classification criteria include such a standard.
Moreover, the benefit prong is specious because the potential benefits
to society an article holds are not relevant to the initial stage of
analysis. The paper can still serve society with miraculous benefits
without being published and widely distributed to friend and foe alike.
For instance, a delay or classification of the methodologies in the
Spanish flu articles would not have preempted the creation of vaccines
and all the benefits purported by its authors and supporters. Rather,
the questions to ask include whether or not: (1) public awareness of the
article presents a risk; (2) public dissemination of methodologies
presents a risk; and (3) dissemination of methodologies should be
limited to professionals with a need to know.
XIV. THE FUNCTION OF TIME
The temporal factor is another essential element of secrecy theory.
It is a critical element similar to risk because its absence negates the
162 Deborah Byrd and Joel Block, Interview with RonaldAtlas, supra note 21 (Atlas said,
"...nor should we look to the US government to impose a regulatory scheme...").
163 Paula Park, supra note 161.
164 Statement on the Consideration of Biodefense and Biosecurity, 421 NATURE 771 (2003)
("FOURTH: We recognize that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of
publication outweighs the potential social benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper
should be modified, or not be published.").
165 Russo, supra note 38.
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ability to protect information.166 The time factor was likewise noted in
the Progressive opinion.167 The goal of a national security secret is to
preserve the strategic advantage of time over adversaries and
competitors. Secrets are not permanent, but they are worthless if thp
do not run long enough to maintain a favorable strategic edge.1
Assessments of scientific secrets in 1970 acknowledged that secrets
were likely to remain secure for about a year. 169 Thus, the information
society presents especially unique challenges to modem secrecy
policy. Designers of secrecy policy had greater margins for error back
when the portability of information was cumbersome and slow. Now,
however, the information society reduces margins for error since flaws
in secrecy policy can have immediate and irreparable effects on
national security. For instance, if a journal accidentally published a
classified formula back in the 1950's, a considerable amount of time
would pass before the publications reached their destinations in the
limited community of mostly academic and government researchers.
Thus, the concept of recall was feasible. Now, however, with the
global reach of instant on-line dissemination, the physical retraction
and ability to recover is limited. Moreover, this problem is
compounded by the falling costs and rising competencies of
individuals capable of using potentially lethal scientific applications.
There are at least two factors to consider in connection with the
temporal element. The duration of the secret is the first factor, and the
means of controlling the secret is second. Considerations in the
duration factor include the length of time it takes for an adversary or
competitor to develop the same targeted technology. If the technology
raises concerns over weapons or accidents of mass destruction
166 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON SECRECY, supra note 15
("Secrecy will usually be most valuable in maintaining a technological lead during the period
of development.").
161 Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 994 ("There are times in the course of human history when
time itself may be very important. This time factor becomes critical when considering mass
annihilation weaponry...").
'6 LEWIs M. BRANSCOMB, U.S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY: ISSUES FOR THE 1990's 30
(1995), available at http://www.schwartzman.org.br/simon/scipol/branscomb.pdf ("[The
Defense Science Board's Bucy Report] proposed that controls should be focused on retarding
transfers of technology which could significantly enhance the military capability of potential
adversaries.").
169 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON SECRECY, supra note 166.
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(WAMD), 170 such as in the case of synthetic biology, then the duration
element may be measured by the length of time it would otherwise
take for the technology or information to become commonly attainable
knowledge.
XV. THE FUNCTION OF LEAKS
Secrecy theory cuts two ways in like manner to secrecy policy.
Just as risk and time are constant elements of federal secrets, so too is
the leak. In addition to the aforementioned sources, sources within the
government have provided another steady stream of information by
way of the leak.17 , It is important to understand the function of the
leak lest it undermine new secrecy paradigms. The leak has grown to
institutional proportions. 172  Thus, it is necessary to review the
function of the leak when evaluating secrecy policy. There appears to
be at least six well established causes for leaks: (1) mistake,17 3  2
political gain, 174 (3) financial gain, (4) foreign loyalty, (5) morality, 7
and (6) personal legacy.
170 Ian Sample, From Frozen Alaska to the Lab: A Virus 39,000 Times more Virulent than Flu,
GuARDN UNLIMITED, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/
0,3605,1585976,00.html ('"Assuming this is a replicant of the 1918 strain, if it got out, it
could initiate disease in humans...' said Prof. Atlas... Viruses have escaped from high-
security labs before. During the recent Sars [sic] outbreak the virus escaped at least twice,
... when researchers became contaminated.").
171 139 CONG. REC. 18,764 (1993) (statement of Rep. Glickman) ("Virtually all the leaks that
take place in this country occur someplace at the executive branch level.").
172 Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Administration Takes Broad Reading of Espionage Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at AIO ("In the circular, echo-chamber world of official
Washington, where government policy makers, members of Congress, analysts, lobbyists and
journalists are forever seeking to cull information from one another to gain an edge, such
conversations are a routine part of doing business and influencing public policy." Reporters'
comments regarding a conversation where classified information was allegedly passed from a
government employee and an influential lobbyist.).
173 Tom Brune, Homeland Secretary: Release of Terror Report was a Mistake, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A7 ("[A] once-secret report that Homeland Security officials say
came to light accidentally after it was posted Monday on the web by the state of Hawaii and
reported in the New York Times yesterday."); (Los Alamos reports a 1/10 to the 7th failure
rate in the release of classified information). Thomas Bowles, supra note 62.
174 Lichtblau & Johnston, supra note 172.
175 See Michel Foucalt, Discourse and Truth: The Problemization of Parrhesia, Berkeley
Lectures 5 (Oct.-Nov. 1983), available at http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/
foucault.discourseAndTruth.pdf ("[P]arrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses
[Vol. 2:1
GORMAN
Leaks for financial gain, foreign loyalty and mistake need little
explanation. Leaks for political gain are more complex because they
are often sanctioned by government officials to assist with the political
goal of an administration or political party. Furthermore, leaks may be
intended to help political careers. Moral leaks, whether anonymous or
of the whistle-blowing variety, are also well known. 1 16  The leak
intended to preserve personal legacy is not as common but is
emerging. This leak or revelation is likely to come from the aging
figure, once bound by loyalty, who may be treated unkindly by history
unless classified information in his favor is released to "correct the
record." The leak by an elderly French admiral over his alleged role in
the sinking of a Green Peace ship in the 1980'S 177 and the self-
unveiling by Michael Felt as "Deep Throat' 7 8 support this notion. In
addition to the aforementioned, a new type of antecedent leak has
emerged as a result of the conflict between the scientific establishment
and the government identified here as the "publisher's veto."
XVI. PUBLISHER'S VETO
The publisher's veto is defined here as the premature publication
of sensitive information despite non-binding requests or a public trust
expectation to refrain from releasing said information before a security
vetting takes place. The publisher's veto has two immediate benefits
for the publisher. First, if the release is wide enough, i.e. via a widely
available public access e-journal, then it immediately ends the dispute
with the government. The government's request to vet the article
becomes moot after the article is widely disseminated. Thus, the
publisher's veto also enables the dumping of sensitive scientific
information resulting in depreciated national security value of the
information. Second, the publisher's veto nullifies export restrictions
by triggering an exception for published information by enabling the
his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty
to improve or help other people...").
176 Blanche Wiesen Cook, Presidential Papers in Crisis: Some Thoughts on Lies, Secrets, and
Silence, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 285,287 (1996) ("In 1986, for example, an anonymous
Veterans Administration worker contacted the National Association of Radiation Survivors to
scream that all documents relating to atomic veterans were about to be shredded.").
177 Marlise Simons, Report Says MitterandApproved Sinking of Greenpeace Ship, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2005, at A3.
178 Michael Janofsky, New Book on Watergate Fleshes out Deep Throat, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2005, at A9.
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claim that such information is "ordinarily published."'179  The
publisher's veto was exercised recently by the journal PNAS with the
Toxic Milk article by Professor Wein. 80 The article detailed ways to
poison the milk supply with botulimum toxin. The government
became aware of the article before widespread distribution and asked
the journal to refrain from publishing the article arguing that it
provides a roadmap for terrorists.18 ' The journal held the article
briefly and then vetoed the government's involvement by publishing it
in a fast track open access manner.'
82
More information is needed in order to determine whether
Tumpey's recent Spanish flu article in Science183 qualifies as a
publisher's veto. It is possible that the editors at Science operated in
good faith by relying on the apparent authority to proceed given by
NIAID Director, Anthony Fauci and CDC Director, Julie
Gerberding. 184  Fauci's and Gerberding's prior knowledge of the
Spanish flu research and bias in favor of publishing this information
begs the question as to what their role should be in providing
prepublication notice of potentially contentious research to the national
security community. 185  The question also applies to the authors,
editors and other federal officials who have prepublication knowledge
of potentially contentious research. Clearly, somebody must have a
duty to provide adequate prepublication notice of such research to a
designated authority from the national security community. If,
however, federal authorities such as Fauci and Gerberding provided
authority from the federal government for Science to proceed until the
late hour, then their actions arguably amounted to a de facto national
security vetting waiver.
179 Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (2005).
Is0 Wein & Liu, supra note 125.
181 Letter from Stewart Simonson, supra note 85.
182 Bruce Alberts, From the Academy Editorial, Modeling Attacks on the Food Supply, 102
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 9737 (2005).
183 Tumpey et al., supra note 10.
18 Russo, supra note 38.
185 Anthony S. Fauci & Julie L. Gerberding, Unmasking the 1918 Influenza Virus: An
Important Step Toward Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (Oct. 5, 2005),
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2005/05 10state.htm.
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Stewart Simonson, the authority who previously asked for
suppression of Wein's toxic milk article a few months prior,
eventually received notice of the Spanish flu article and immediately
asked for advice from NSABB.18 6 With or without knowledge that the
article was inexorably en route to the presses, NSABB convened for
the second time in its history via emergency deliberations through
cross country communications.1 87 The result of these deliberations
was an approval of the article citing a standard the Board had yet to
debate and recommend for government use, i.e. the preponderance of
harm standard.188 Clearly, the Spanish flu scenario highlights flaws in
the system that need immediate attention.
The publisher's veto is a consequence, in part, of the prevailing
view in secrecy theory which holds that publicly available information
is beyond capture because it is futile to classify that which is already
public. The same principle is applied in the protection of trade secrets
in private industry. But, the difference is that the business holding the
trade secret must negligently disclose its own secret to terminate trade
secret agreements. 1  The "pure" secret view was likewise found in
Carter's E.O. 12,065 which mandated that once information was
declassified and released to the public, it could not be reclassified.
The problem with this view is that it fails to consider the gradients of
exposure of the information. The assumption in Carter's order is that
classified information must be contained like air in a balloon. As soon
as there is the smallest compromise of the information, like the prick
of a balloon, the classification is rendered useless. This view is clearly
flawed because previously exposed information can exist in many
situations in public pockets, such as a few research labs, without
undermining the effectiveness of the protection of information from
certain targets. The modem trend rejects this rigid approach in the
analogous arena of export control where President Clinton rejected
186 Russo, supra note 38.
187 Id. ("Kennedy noted in an Oct. 6 interview that even if the board had voted to stop the
paper, the journal was too late in the printing process to do anything about it.").
188 id.
"9 William M. Fitzpatrick, Samuel A. Dilullo & Donald R. Burke, Trade Secret Piracy and
Protection: Corporate Espionage, Corporate Security and the Law, 12 ADvANcES IN
COMPETITvENESS REs. 57 (2004).
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license decisions based upon foreign availability of encryption
products.
190
XVII. CAPTURING AND COUNTING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
At present there are mechanisms in place to capture sensitive
articles in the interests of national security, but there is a gap in the
paradigm. Capture mechanisms were conceived and created in the
1940's and 1950's through the AEA and Patent Act, but have not
changed since then. The next opportunity to amend capture
mechanisms after the AEA and Patent Acts came with the advent of
research on recombinant DNA, but decisive and responsible actions
taken by the scientific community contained the issue. In lieu of a
capture mechanism, a voluntary moratorium on research was
instituted, which helped to instill public confidence in scientists'
intentions and efforts. Thus, an agreement in the 1970's involving
government oversight through the National Institutes of Health was
well received. 191 Although a voluntary moratorium on contentious
publications may help improve public confidence in the scientific
community in the instant matter, it is doubtful the present situation
would resolve in like manner to Asilomar. The current situation is
different in that the problem stems in large part from the potential
misuse by an adversary. In contrast, the risk with R-DNA was
perceived as coming from the accidental misuse by well intentioned
scientists. Thus, the instant dual use dilemma is less amenable to the
Asilomar approach used in the 1970's.' 92  Likewise, the need to
capture some contentious articles is a reality for the time being in the
post 9-11 era.
The decades old capture program at the Patent Office shows that
inventions or techniques previously exposed to any number of
professionals can successfully be classified by the government. This
program has proven effective and has actually escaped charges of
over-classification. Statistics from the Patent Office also indicate that
the number of S.O.s have not increased dramatically since 9-11. The
established record on the classification of science from the private
190 See President Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders on Encryption Export Policy, (Nov.
15, 1996), http://www.cdt.org/crypto/admin/961115letter.html.
191 Paul Berg, Asilomar and Recombinant DNA, http://nobelprize.org/chenistry/articles/berg
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
'9' See id.
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sector is most relevant to this debate and bodes well for those with
concerns that the government may over-classify in the development of
the next capture mechanism.
There were 4,885 S.O.s in effect at the end of fiscal year 2 0 0 4 .93
But, only 61 S.O.s applied to private parties for the same period.
Moreover, when looking at the trends in new and rescinded S.O.s, it
appears that 9-11 did not have a major impact on the capture of
scientific techniques through the Patent Office. (See Table 2). It is
also interesting, if not surprising, to note the relatively low number of
S.O.s issued during President George W. Bush's tenure.
Table 2: New S. O's Compared to Rescinded S. 0 's from 1988 to 2004
I M New S.O.'s U Rescinded S.O.'s
"~900-80
-700
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
There is little opposition to the claim that the government is over-
classifying information since 9-11.194 Congressional testimony from
William Leonard, director of the ISOO, and Carol Haave,
Undersecretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security, "both
193 Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy, http://fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention (last visited Oct.
18, 2005).
194 Trent Lott & Ron Wyden, Hiding the Truth in a Cloud of Black Ink, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2004, at A27; Shane, supra note 19.
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estimated that an astounding percentage of secret material is
improperly classified."'' 95 But the conservative trend in classification
rates through S.O.'s is in stark contrast to the classification rates
reported by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) in other
branches of government.
Clearly, the rate of classification should always be questioned in a
democracy, but evaluations and comparisons need to be accurate and
controlled for changes over time. For instance, the New York Times
reported that "[a] record 15.6 million documents were classified [in
2004], nearly double the number in 2001. "196 This statistic can be seen
in a much different light, however, when compared to classification
statistics from 1984, another period when the nation was on a defense
footing. The Stilwell Report stated, "DoD [Department of Defense]
reported that some 16 million documents were classified in 1984."
197
The raw number of secrets will rise over time despite the most
aggressive declassification programs.
The growth of technology and increased sharing of classified
information will lead to higher raw numbers of secrets resulting in an
inflation of secrets which has to be adjusted before making comparison
to historical numbers. For instance, Frederick L. Jones cited an
increase in e-mail usage for the rise in classification statistics since 9-
11.198 By comparison, the DoD only started to integrate computers
into their offices in the mid-1980's.1 9 Today, however, e-mails are
widely used throughout government. For example, Los Alamos
Laboratory alone generates over 300,000 e-mails per day.200  in
addition, more secrets will be generated as more agencies share
classified information. The result of which will be "derivative
classification decisions" resulting from incorporating, paraphrasing,
195 Editorial, supra note 103.
196 Shane, supra note 19.
19 COMMISSION TO REVIEW DOD SECURITY POLICY AND PRACTICES, KEEPING THE NATION'S
SECRETS (1985), available at http//www.fas.org/sgp/library/stilwell.html.
198 Shane, supra note 19.
199 COMMISSION TO REVIEW DOD SECURITY POLICY AND PRACTICES, supra note 197.
200 Bowles, supra note 62 (Classified information is, however, transmitted via secure networks
at Los Alamos rather than e-mails which are screened by senders or "Authorized Derivative
Classifiers" for clearance.).
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restating, or regenerating previously classified information.20 1
Moreover, for the sake of balance, notice needs to be taken of other
changes that have likely played a role in the classification statistics.
For instance, the fact that in March of 2003, 180,000 federal
employees merged from 22 agencies to form a new Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), committed to sensitive security issues,
should be taken into consideration.20 2  Thus, inclusion of the new
sources of classified information should be noted, if not controlled for,
in classification statistics to help provide perspective.
After taking a step back from the raw statistics and critical
judgments, it is ironic that an alleged crisis of over-classification is
taking place at a point in time when more information than ever is
available to the average citizen about everything from anthrax 203 to zip
codes 204 at the click of a mouse. Moreover, there is greater access to
government due to those who vigilantly watch the governmene0 5 and
to the government itself206 as compared to a mere decade ago, despite
the recent web scrubbing of SBU information. 20 7 Contributing to the
complexity of this debate is the fact that scientific institutions want
openness, but not when open access initiatives like PubChem cuts into
the lucrative business of selling scientific information.20 8 Regardless,
201 Agency Security Classification Management Program Data, National Archives and
Records Administration, Standard Form 311 (Rev. 11-04).
202 Dep't of Homeland, The U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Preserving Our
Freedoms, Protecting Our Nation - Strategic Plan (Feb. 23, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/displaytheme=10&content=-3240.
203 See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Disease Listing: Anthrax,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/anthraxg.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
204 See U.S. Postal Service, ZIP Code Lookup, http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/welcome.jsp (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005).
205 See Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005);
OMB Watch, http://www.ombwatch.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
206 FirstGov.Gov: The U.S. Government's Official Web Portal, http://www.firstgov.gov (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005); Federal Citizen Information Center, FirstGov.Gov Fact Sheet,
http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/firstgov-fs.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005) ("FirstGov.Gov
provides access to over 180 million pages of web based federal, state and local government
resources available 24/7."); PubMed Central, http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov (last visited
Oct. 18,2005).
207 The Card Memo, supra note 84.
208 Letter from William F. Carroll, Jr., American Chemical Society President (June 20, 2005),
available at http://acswebcontent.acs.org/PDF/pubchem-open-letter.pdf (opining loss of
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the quantity and quality of information is proliferating, as evidenced
by live and archived web casts of the Federal Advisory Committee
known as the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.
20 9
Television remains an important source of information through 24
hour news channels and new programming such as C-SPAN which
provides "gavel to gavel" coverage of government events.210  Thus,
more careful attention needs to be paid to the functions of government
that need transparency for the survival of democracy.
211
XVIII. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE
In the absence of cooperation between the private sector and the
government, the government may need to utilize both traditional and
novel approaches to reach its national security obligations in the
information society. For instance, the government relies upon
deterrence tactics to encourage compliance with government secrecy
when the country is on a war footing, as evidenced by the rare
prosecution in the Morison and Franklin spy cases during the Cold
War and post 9-11 era respectively. The government, however, also
displayed its capacity for creativity in secrecy matters during
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In an effort to restrict
access to views of military actions in Afghanistan, the U.S.
government actually captured the desired information by purchasing
all of the available satellite images from a civilian source, Ikonos,
revenue to government's open access initiative PubChem); see also IRS Form 990, 2003
Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, American Chemical Society, 1155
Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-4892 (Gross Receipts Line L:
2,890,079,272).
209 Meeting of National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (July 1, 2005),
http://www.webconferences.com/nihnsabb/july_12005.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
210 C-SPAN Mission, http://www.c-span.org/about/company/index.asp?code=Mission (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005) ("[L]ive gavel to gavel proceedings of the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and other forums where public policy is discussed,
debated and decided...").
21  Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCl. Q., 181, 192 (1999) ("Democratic
accountability does not require unconditional publicity in the conduct of democratic
government. Secrecy of various kinds is sometimes justified and even desirable in a
democracy. But it is justified only under carefully specified conditions, which ensure that the
secrecy itself is subject to democratic accountability."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
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covering the coordinates of concern.2 12 The government took this
approach over "shutter control," the black out of the media, because
they anticipated lawsuits from news organizations claiming unlawful
prior restraint.213 The only other source of satellite images of the area
came from a French firm called Spot Image, but the U.S. convinced
the French Defense Ministry to ban Spot Image from selling their
images of the areas that the U.S. was trying to control.21 4 Thus, there
are many-approaches to capturing sensitive information that must be
considered in formulating secrecy policy with dual use science.
New and creative paradigms need to be created to reward
compliance for joint vetting with the government and prepublication
review of contentious research to avoid adversarial standoffs and
rushed vetting as exemplified, respectively, by the Toxic Milk and
Spanish flu controversies. Moreover, the Executive should use
progressive management practices with government personnel
responsible for classifying information to reward accurate
classification decisions.
Clearly, the government has many options from police powers to
the art of persuasion at its disposal to meet the challenge presented by
domestic terrorism in the age of information. In the case of dual use
science, the government has made a historic and unprecedented effort
to listen to any and all advice from a highly respected advisory board
in the NSABB. Thus, the window is open for the infusion of
innovative ideas to create a new paradigm to manage the dual use
issue. But time is of the essence, and immediate action needs to be
taken to close the gaping loop holes through which the integrity of
national security and public health may flow.
XD. THE EXECUTIVE OPTION
The NSABB convened for the first time in June 2005 to address
the dual use issue; however, years have passed since the government
first asked the scientific community for guidance on this issue. Thus, a
new paradigm on open science remains an ideal without form or
212 Duncan Campbell, US Buys Up All Satellite War Images, THE GuARDIAN, Oct. 17,2001,
at 1.
2131id
214 Theresa Hitchens, Vice President, Center for Defense Information, Presentation to a
Conference "U.S. Space Operations in the International Context," (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.cdi.org/fiiendlyversion/printversion.cfin?documentD=-2 111.
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substance. Meanwhile, science marches on, continuing to produce
contentious research without the safeguards of reliable risk measures
to judge the appropriate level of protection these articles should have
against potential adversaries and terrorists. Moreover, after all this
time, the government does not even have a mechanism in place to
trigger notice of impending contentious publications by U.S. scientists.
This flaw was partly responsible for the recent vetting debacle with the
Spanish flu articles.
It is indeed striking that the U.S. government was reduced to
feckless vetting of research on the deadliest virus on record2 15
conducted by U.S. scientists in its own CDC biosafety level-3 lab.
The fact that the Assistant Secretary of HHS was only informed of the
impending publication of the Spanish flu articles after the publisher's
point of no return216 begs many questions. While the communication
problems within the government can be addressed in short order, the
question remains over how the government will be assured of adequate
prepublication notice of contentious research from government and
non-government sources before formal systems are implemented.21
The Bush administration has a duty to act on this issue as soon as
possible in the interests of national security. At a minimum, it is
necessary for the government to have pre-publication notice of articles
on high risk materials that are already under federal controls.
218
Relatively quick measures could be coordinated on an international
level through an intersession agreement from the Australia Group
219
215 Roger Highfield, Most Deadly Virus is Resurrected, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct.
6, 2005, at 4 ("The deadliest virus on record has been resurrected from a strain of influenza
that was preserved in the frozen body of a victim of the 1918 pandemic and triggered a row
about whether the benefits of its recreation outweigh the risks.").
216 Russo, supra note 38 ("Kennedy noted in an Oct. 6 interview that even if the board had
voted to stop the paper, the journal was too late in the printing process to do anything about
it.").
217 Russo, supra note 38 ("'[Osterholm] acknowledged that the [NSABB] does not yet have a
process in place to monitor pre-publication research by non-government researchers who do
not feel obligated to have HHS vet their findings.' Donald Kennedy editor of Science said, 'I
think there's some questions to be raised about how this should be organized."').
218 See Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 42 C.F.R. § 73 (Mar. 18, 2005); Use
and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 9 C.F.R. § 121 (Mar. 18, 2005).
2 19 Definitions of Terms as Used in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R.
§722.1 (2005) ("The countries participating in the Australia Group have agreed to adopt
harmonized controls on certain dual-use chemicals (i.e. precursor chemicals), biological
agents, related manufacturing facilities and equipment, and related technology in order to
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on the pre-publication review and sharing of contentious life science
research among its thirty-nine members. Consistent with such an
agreement, the EAR may be used to provide a pre-publication trigger
mechanism by proscribing unlicensed release of contentious science
before safeguarded sharing at an international level, but this route
would take a significant amount of time to implement. 220  In the
interim, however, the Executive could immediately create a trigger
mechanism assuring prepublication notice of articles on select agents,
toxins, and microorganisms associated with pandemics and
bioweapons by amending the EAR. The Executive could amend the
EAR in the interests of national security under authority of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 22" just as
President Clinton did when he amended export policy on cryptology
technology.
222
Thus, the President could fashion a stopgap measure by merely
removing the basic research exemption223 from the limited area of
select agents, pandemic-related materials, toxins and microorganisms
subject to export control.2 24 This action would require a license for the
publication of such information and provide prepublication notice to
the national security community of potentially contentious research.
Thus, no science is subject to arbitrary classification by the
government or censorship by scientific publishers. Rather, the
removal of the loophole exemption related to the aforementioned
materials will prevent further vetting debacles and nullify the
publisher's veto until the government codifies new laws to address this
dilemma. Years have passed since the dual use issue in the life
sciences was identified and it may take many more years to create a
ensure that exports of these items do not contribute to proliferation of chemical or biological
weapons.").
220 See Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Control Policy: End User, 15
C.F.R. pt. 744 (2005), (The rule is an amendment of EAR through administrative action in
response to a new agreement through the Australia Group.).
221 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq. (2003).
22 Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 190.
m See Scope of the Export Administration Regulations: Information Resulting from
Fundamental Research, 15 C.F.R. § 734.8(b)(6) (2005) (concerning nullification of
fundamental research exemption for acceptance of national security controls or on government
sponsored research projects).
224 See HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins Commerce Control List, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
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new paradigm to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. It is, however,
incumbent upon the Executive to act immediately to obtain
prepublication notice of critical national security information in the
interim. Then and only then can the national security implications of
contentious life science articles be evaluated properly on a case by
case basis.
This proposal will, no doubt, be met with resistance by members of
the scientific community who have lobbied against governmental
involvement in the publication process. Unfortunately, however, it
may take unilateral Executive action such as this to preempt specious
censorship agreements, the publisher's veto, and moot vetting
scenarios until a new paradigm that assures a meaningful partnership
between the scientific and national security communities is adopted.
